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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred by Permitting the State to Introduce Evidence of Crimes, 
Wrongs, and Bad Acts Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Cardoza explained how he was harmed by the district court 
permitting the State to introduce the confidential informants statement's regarding prior drug 
dealings with Mr. Cardoza as well as evidence of a large quantity of methamphetamine being 
found inside a vehicle registered to Mr. Cardoza in Oregon. Mr. Cardoza also explained how the 
admission of this evidence in the State's case in chief was in error and direct contravention to 
Idaho appellate cases addressing this precise issue. Finally, Mr. Cardoza highlighted how the 
prosecuting attorney capitalized on this evidence and argued in his closing statement that the jury 
should make the inference that Mr. Cardoza must be guilty in this case because of the "magical 
coincidences" of the other crimes, wrongs, and bad acts of Mr. Cardoza. Jury Trial Transcript, p. 
382, Ins. 3-24. 
In response, the State argues that Mr. Cardoza invited the district court's error, that the 
highly prejudicial propensity evidence was nonetheless relevant to Mr. Cardoza's intent and 
knowledge even though Mr. Cardoza never claimed he was innocent by reason of not knowing 
the substance in the borrowed vehicle he was driving was methamphetamine or that he was not 
familiar with methamphetamine, that the propensity evidence was not overly prejudicial despite 
the fact the prosecuting attorney unabashedly argued propensity to the jury, and finally that any 
error committed by the district court was harmless. The State's arguments are unpersuasive and 
should be rejected. Moreover, absent from the State's argument is any explanation why cases 
such as State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 267 P.3d 721 (Ct. App. 200 I), where the Court of 
Appeals unequivocally cautioned that evidence of prior drug sales is highly prejudicial, should 
not control here. 
1. Mr. Cardoza did not Invite or Induce the District Court into Committing Error and 
is not Precluded from Arguing on Appeal Admission of Evidence of Crimes, 
Wrongs, and Bad Acts was Incorrect 
Citing State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) and the doctrine of 
invited error, the State argues Mr. Cardoza should be precluded from arguing on appeal that the 
confidential informant's testimony about prior drug dealings with Mr. Cardoza is not relevant. 1 
On appeal in Norton, the defendant argued that the admission into evidence of an interrogation 
transcript was fundamental error. Id. at 187, 254 P.3d at 88. Defense counsel at trial however 
had stipulated to the admission of the same transcript. Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that 
the defendant cannot complain of error on appeal when the claimed error was stipulated to during 
trial. Id. 
Here, Mr. Cardoza did not stipulate to the admission of any propensity evidence. Mr. 
Cardoza's trial counsel argued this evidence was unfairly prejudicial and precisely the sort of 
evidence I.R.E. 404(b) was designed to protect against. Trial Transcript, p. 137, In. 22 - p. 142, 
In. 7. Mr. Cardoza does acknowledge trial counsel, albeit wrongly, stated that the State made a 
showing that the confidential informant's proffered testimony was relevant to the issue of intent. 
Trial Transcript, p. 139, Ins. 1-7. This however, does not preclude Mr. Cardoza from arguing on 
appeal that the district court erred in admitting this evidence. Accepting for the sake of argument 
1 It is important to note the State did not suggest that the doctrine of invited error 
precludes Mr. Cardoza from arguing the court erred in admitting the confidential informant's 
testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) or that the evidence of other charged crimes in Oregon was 
not relevant, highly prejudicial, and should not have been admitted as evidence in the State's case 
in chief. 
2 
that this evidence can be relevant to the issue of intent, as explained in Mr. Cardoza' s Opening 
Brief, Idaho appellate courts have cautioned that evidence of prior drug dealings is highly 
prejudicial and in some circumstances has a very low probative value. See e.g., State v. Naranjo, 
152 Idaho 134, 267 P.3d 721 (Ct. App. 2011); and State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 178 P.3d 28 
(2008). In sum, the invited error doctrine, even if applicable to the narrow issue of the relevancy 
regarding the confidential informant's testimony about prior drug dealings, does not prevent this 
Court from reviewing the district court's decision to admit evidence under I.RE. 404(b) for an 
abuse of discretion. 
2. The State Fails to Recognize and Satisfactorily Address the Highly Prejudicial 
Impact of the I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Cardoza quoted the district court's I.R.E. 403 "analysis" and 
pointed out how it was woefully absent any explanation or balancing to determine whether the 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. In 
response, the State argues that "[e]ven without the district court's findings, in balancing the 
prejudicial value of the evidence against its probative value, this Court can conclude that its 
probative value is not substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice." Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 23-24. The State then minimizes the effect of the propensity evidence at issue in this 
case stating," [a]lthough it might be prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to Cardoza for a 
jury to know about the ongoing methamphetamine trafficking arrangement Cardoza had with 
Juan and Tapia, such information would not be unfairly prejudicial." Id. at 24. 
The evidence of prior drug dealings and the finding of a large amount of 
methamphetamine is not something that "might" be prejudicial - it is prejudicial. These 
inflammatory facts carry great prejudice in cases of this sort. It is difficult to imagine how a jury 
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could not conclude that Mr. Cardoza was more likely to have committed the crime at issue in this 
case having heard about prior drug dealings and large quantities of methamphetamine found 
elsewhere yet linked to Mr. Cardoza. The protections of I.R.E. 404(b) are at risk of being 
completely taken away unless courts strictly scrutinize this sort of evidence and properly balance 
the very real and unfair prejudices against the probative value of such evidence. Here the balance 
must tip in Mr. Cardoza's favor and the evidence should not have been admissible- at the very 
least it should not have been admissible in the State's case in chief. 
3. The Admission of Propensity Evidence was not Harmless Error 
The State also argues Mr. Cardoza is not entitled to relief on appeal because any error in 
admitting propensity evidence against him was harmless. Response Brief, p. 25. Citing State v. 
Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 193 P .3d 878 (Ct. App. 2008), the State suggests that it is highly 
unlikely the jury convicted Mr. Cardoza based upon propensity evidence in light of the strength 
of the State's case. Id. The State's argument is unpersuasive. 
Unlike Gamble, in this case this Court should be unable to "declare, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the [propensity evidence] complained of 
contributed to the conviction." Id. at 341, 193 P.3d at 888. Here, as noted in his Opening Brief, 
the case against Mr. Cardoza was premised upon Mr. Cardoza's constructive possession of 
methamphetamine found in a borrowed vehicle. There were no fingerprints or other forensic 
evidence linking Mr. Cardoza to the methamphetamine. Trial Transcript, p. 201, In. 12 - p. 202, 
In. 3. Nor did Mr. Cardoza ever admit to possessing the methamphetamine. Trial Transcript, p. 
208, Ins. 16-24. Instead, most of the evidence suggesting Mr. Cardoza knowingly possessed the 
methamphetamine at issue in this case was premised upon the confidential informant's testimony 
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about prior drug dealings with Mr. Cardoza and the evidence that a large quantity of 
metharnphetarnine was found in Oregon inside a vehicle registered to Mr. Cardoza. 
The State's argument that any error should be considered harmless error is further 
undermined by the prosecuting attorney emphasizing in his closing argument that if Mr. Cardoza 
was not a drug dealer why did they find metharnphetarnine in his truck in Oregon. There is a 
very real possibility this evidence contributed to Mr. Cardoza's conviction. 
III. ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL 
A. The District Court Properly Denied the State's Request for Restitution for the 
Prosecutor's Attorney Fees 
The district court appropriately denied the State's request for restitution for fees 
associated with preparing Mr. Cardoza' s case for trial. The issue before this Court involves 
interpreting a statute, specifically Idaho Code § 37-2732(k). "Where the language of a statute is 
plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction." State v. Garcia-Pineda, 154 Idaho 482, 482, 299 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. 
App. 2013) (citing State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999)). The 
language of the statute must be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 
Idaho at 659. However, when ambiguity exists, the Court must engage in statutory construction 
and ascertain the legislative intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. 
App. 2001). "To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, 
but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative 
history." Garcia-Pineda, 154 Idaho at 482 (citing Beard, 135 Idaho at 646)). 
As illustrated below, under the plain language of LC. § 37-2732(k) restitution does not 
include the prosecuting attorney's fees in preparing for and going to trial. Even if this Court 
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finds the statute to be ambiguous, the legislative history and public policy further illustrate the 
legislature's intent that restitution not include attorney fees. 
1. A Prosecutor's Fees Incurred in Prosecuting a Drug Case are not Recoverable 
Restitution Under the Plain Language of LC.§ 37-2732(k) 
Idaho Code§ 37-2732(k) allows a court to order restitution in drug cases for the "costs 
incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation." (Emphasis added). Such 
costs do not include the prosecuting attorney's fees. Idaho Code§ 37-2732(k) provides in 
relevant part: 
The court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in 
investigating the violation. Law enforcement agencies shall include, but not be 
limited to, the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the 
office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney offices. 
Costs shall include, but not be limited to, those incurred for the purchase of 
evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses 
throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials, and any other 
investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries 
of employees. 
LC. § 37-2732(k). This statute, which enables a court to order that the defendant bear the burden 
oflaw enforcement's investigative costs for a drug conviction, is broken down into two parts. 
First the definition of "law enforcement agencies" and second the definition of "costs." Law 
enforcement agencies are defined as "the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement 
agencies, the office of the attorney general and county and city prosecuting attorney offices." Id. 
There appears to be no dispute that the prosecuting attorney office is considered a "law 
enforcement agency." The dispute arises in the definition of "costs." Costs are defined as 
"[costs] incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law enforcement officers 
and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, hearing and trials, and any other 
investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees." 
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Id (Emphasis added). 
The State argues that the definition of "costs" includes the prosecuting attorney's hourly 
rate in preparing for and taking Mr. Cardoza' s case to trial. This is not the case as attorney fees 
are not included in the restitution statute, but rather are beyond the plain language of the statute. 
The State bases this argument in part on this Court's ruling that LC. 37-2732(k) includes the 
hourly rate of a law enforcement officers to attend a hearing. State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 
834-35, 252 P.3d 563, 567-68 (Ct. App. 2010). However, the statute specifically allows for that. 
See LC. § 37-2732(k) ("travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witnesses 
throughout the course of the investigation, hearing and trial ... "). The statute arguably even 
includes time spent by an investigator employed by the prosecuting attorney office. See LC.§ 
37-2732(k) ("and any other investigative or prosecution expenses actually incurred, including 
regular salaries of employees"). However, "prosecution expenses" do not include the hourly rate 
of the handling prosecuting attorney to prosecute the case. The prosecuting attorney's hourly rate 
is clearly not included in the plain language of LC. § 37-2732(k), and as such, the Court properly 
denied the state's request for the prosecutor's attorney fees. 
2. The Legislature did not Intend for LC. § 37-2732(k) to Include the Costs of 
Prosecution 
In looking at the public policy and discerning the legislature's intent, LC. § 37-2732(k) 
does not include the prosecuting attorney's hourly rate to prepare for and take Mr. Cardoza's case 
to trial. If this Court finds LC. § 37-2732(k) to be ambiguous, it must engage in statutory 
construction. Beard, 135 Idaho at 646. Statutory construction entails looking at the legislative 
history and public policy to discern the legislature's intent. Id. The legislative history does not 
include great discussion of the intent for including the disputed provisions of the restitution 
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statute, however some guidance is provided. 
The relevant language was added in 1986 by Senate Bill 1419 and was taken up in the 
same discussion as expanding the forfeiture statute, the latter of which was the focus of the 
Statement of Purpose. (Attached at Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Statement of 
Purpose and Fiscal Impact for Senate Bill 1419.) That said, the fiscal impact section touches 
upon the restitution issue. The fiscal impact states in part: 
In a court ordered restitution upon a felony conviction for certain costs of 
investigation, the fiscal impact cannot be precisely estimated. However, the 
reimbursement of the investigative costs will result in a net positive fiscal impact 
since the budget for narcotics enforcement for the Department of Law 
Enforcement alone is approximately two million ($2,000,000) per annum. 
See Exhibit A (emphasis added). This is insightful for two reasons. First, the fiscal impact 
statement refers to "certain costs of investigation" not "certain costs of investigation and 
prosecution." If the legislature intended for prosecuting attorney offices to recoup the costs of 
prosecuting drug offenses, such language would have been specifically added. Second, the fiscal 
impact statement mentions "the budget for narcotics enforcement for the Department of Law 
Enforcement," again there is no mention of the budget or costs for prosecuting attorney offices. 
The legislature's lack of intent to include a prosecutor's attorney fees is also evident by 
looking at the language in the statute itself. The legislature is very familiar with attorney fees 
and had they wished to include such fees in the restitution statute they could have easily done so. 
Or at a minimum, the legislature could have included "prosecuting attorneys" in the portion of 
LC. § 37-2732(k) allowing for "travel and per diem for law enforcement officers and witness 
throughout the course of the investigation, hearings and trials .... " Id. However, rather than 
including "prosecuting attorneys" in that section, the legislature used the conjunction and, thus 
separating payments for officers to attend hearings from "any other investigative or prosecution 
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expenses actually incurred, including regular salaries of employees." Id. This further illustrates 
that the legislature did not intend restitution to include the costs of a prosecuting attorney to 
prepare for and attend hearings. Because the legislature chose not to include a provision for the 
costs of prosecution or attorney fees, such fees are not recoverable under I.C. § 37-2732(k). See 
also State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856, 861, 153 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Ct. App. 2006) ("In criminal 
cases, costs and attorney fees have been denied for lack of statutory authority. [The defendant's] 
argument is therefore better presented to the legislature.") (internal citations omitted). 
Public policy further supports affirming the district court's denial of the State's request 
for attorney fees. A warding the State restitution for the costs of prosecuting a drug charge 
creates a disincentive for the prosecutor to resolve cases. As stated in the Defendant's Objection 
to State's Request for Restitution for Prosecution Costs, incorporated herein, if going to trial in 
drug cases became a "money-maker" for prosecuting attorney offices, then prosecutors would 
have a disincentive to resolve cases through plea negotiations. This disincentive violates public 
policy which recognizes a prosecutor's responsibility to administer justice. In conclusion, not 
only does the plain language of LC. § 37-2732(k) exclude prosecutor's attorney fees from 
restitution, but engaging in statutory construction and discerning the legislature's intent further 
supports affirming the district court's order. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Cardoza's Opening Brief, this Court should 
vacate his judgment of conviction and sentences. Furthermore, the District Court's Order on 
Contested Restitution should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this$__ day of September, 2013. 
e ownson 
Att rney for Martin Cardoza 
JO 
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STATEMENI' OF PURPOSE 
'!he auendrrent provides for court ordered restitution to state, county and 
·city law enforcement agencies a.rd prosecutors' offices upon a felony .conviction 
~ for certain costs of investigation. 
'!he unamerned statute provides for forfeiture of "m:mey or currency" found 
}in "close prox:1m1.ty" to illicit controlled substances when the court finds that 
such property was used or interned for use in v+olation of the Contr-olled Sub-
'lhe pr9posal exPa.nas and clarifies what is "currency" by describing 
-pther ccmmn mediums of exchar:ge. It also provides that such items representing 
forfeiture when found in close prox1m1ty to illicit drugs. 
'lbe requisite firrling by the coort of use or intent for use in connection with 
t_raff1ck1ng of controlled substances is el1m1nated. 
'lhe proposal provides that marijuana may be destroyed in the field when the 
DJ,.rector of the Department . of Law Enforcerrent ·or his dP.signee finds that it is 
reasonable to carcy such evidence fran the field. Marijuana eradication ei'forts 
undeveloped areas, such as are found in state arrl national 
To require by statute the rerroval of large quantities of 
unnecessary and burdensome. Evident1ary concerns are accom-
npdated by r~u1r1ng the keeping of samples, taking photograpns arrl observation 
The present statute, which this proposal rurends, requires 
that destruction t.e done under the su:r:ervlsion of representatives of the D::partment 
Welfare and of the Board of Pharm:l~~·. 'lhe ~ndrrent provides for 
the destruction 1n the field by two-persons> one or whom ls the 
the Director of the Departrrent of Law Enforcerrent. 
EXHIBIT _Jj __ 
)!'fl? 
Federal drug enforcerrent agencies have ·notified state agencies that 
properties forfeited under federal forfeiture procedures may be given to state 
drug enforcement agencies for their use 1n enforcing state arxi federal controlled 
substances acts where there is author! ty .for receipt thereof' in state law. 'lhe 
amerrlment provides a vehicle for receipt arrl use of sucll property arrl for deposit 
o.f proceeds in the narcotics en.forcerrent account. 
FISCAL IMPAar 
In a court ordered restitution upon a felony conviction for certain costs 
... 
of investigation, t11e fiscal impact cannot ·be precisely estimated. However, the 
reimbursement of investigative costs will result in a net positive fiscal impact 
since the budget for narcotics enforcerrent for the Department or law Enforcement 
alone is approximately two million dollars ($2,0001 000) per annum. 
( 
With regard to forfeiture of m:mey or currency found in "close proximity", ( 
the Departrrent of law Enforcenent foresees an increaae in the volurre of property 
forfeited by state arrl federal agencies for violations of the controlled substances 
act. 'lhe exact value of such property is impossible to predict. However, the 
proposal, insofar a.s it addresses forfeitures, Will definitely have a net positive 
fiscal impact. 
The destruction of marijuana in the field will eliminate co.sts of transporting 
and storing large quantities of drugs and equiprrent.. 'Ihis will result in a net 
positive fisc~l imp::lct. 
Proposed authorizatfon for state agencies to receive do;iations of property 
from federal agencies and fran private citizens will have a net positive fiscal 
imract. 
